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Abstract
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to
outside options. The size of the pie is commonly known and each party
privately knows the realization of her outside option. Parties are as-
sumed to have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their
outside option payoﬀ in any event. Besides, agents can receive no sub-
sidy ex post. We show that ineﬃciencies are inevitable for virtually all
distributions of outside options, as long as the size of the surplus gen-
erated by the agreement is uncertain and may be arbitrarily small for
all realizations of either party’s outside option. Our ineﬃciency result
holds true whatever the degree of correlation between the distributions
of outside options, and even if it is known for sure that an agreement is
beneﬁcial. The same insights apply to the bargaining between a buyer
and a seller privately informed of their valuations and to public good
problems among agents privately informed of their willingness to pay.
1 Introduction
Private information is known to induce ineﬃciencies in a number of im-
portant economic applications. A well known illustration follows from the
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1celebrated impossibility theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983): Bar-
gaining between a seller and a buyer must result in ineﬃciencies when each
agent privately knows the valuation for herself of the item for sale, there is
some uncertainty as to which agent values the good more, and, most im-
portantly, valuations are independently distributed between the seller and
the buyer. Similar conclusions arise for other applications like the provision
of public goods or bargaining situations in which private information bears
on the outside option. But, a key feature of all such results is that private
information should be independently distributed between the various agents.
In many applications, the assumption that private information is inde-
pendently distributed across agents seems very demanding. For example
in the seller/buyer problem the seller and the buyer may know that they
have similar tastes, resulting in positive correlations of the valuations. In
bargaining with outside options, if the environment is competitive, a signal
that a party has a good outside option may indicate that the other party
has a poor outside option, resulting in negatively correlated distributions of
outside options. It is thus of practical importance to understand the eﬀect
of private information when correlations are allowed.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that whenever parties
can exert a veto right and get their reservation value at any point in time,
ineﬃciencies are inevitable, even if the distributions of private signals are
correlated between agents, as long as agents can receive no outside subsidy.
The idea that parties can exert their veto right at any point in time is
novel in the mechanism design literature in which it is generally assumed
that once an agent has agreed to participate in the mechanism he has no
further right to quit.1 Under the usual interim participation constraints,
eﬃciency can be obtained in the correlated case even without subsidy (from
an ex ante viewpoint). This follows from the work of Crémer and McLean
(1986) (see also Myerson (1981) and Johnson et al. (1990)). But, when
agents keep their right to quit at any point in time (as is assumed with the
1Ex post participation constraints are sometimes examined. Note however that such
constraints are usually combined with a dominant strategy implementation requirement.
Besides, as we will later emphasize, the veto right idea is not equivalent to imposing ex
post participation constraints.
2veto right idea) ineﬃciencies are inevitable even in the correlated case.
The veto right idea is well suited to deal with those applications in
which parties never make binding decisions until a complete agreement is
ratiﬁed by all interested parties. In the seller/buyer bargaining problem
this means that in any event the seller must get at least her valuation and
the buyer must get a non-negative payoﬀ. In the bargaining with outside
option application, this means that in any event parties must get at least
their outside option payoﬀs. Our ineﬃciency result applies to the equilibria
of any game (whether one-shot or multi-stage) in which each party keeps
the right to quit and gets her reservation value (the one that she can obtain
on her own without the consent of other parties) before the ﬁnal agreement
is implemented.
The veto rights obviously limit the set of transfers that can possibly be
implemented. It is thus not surprising that when the distributions of private
information are almost independent between agents ineﬃciencies must arise
as in the case of independent distributions.2
But, our ineﬃciency result does not solely arise for small degrees of
correlation. We prove that ineﬃciencies are inevitable for virtually all dis-
tributions of private information whatever their degree of correlation. This
should be thought of as a surprising result given that the veto right con-
straints a priori leave signiﬁcant room for complex transfer schemes between
agents.
Our paper can thus be viewed as providing a strong argument as to why
private information, even if correlated among agents, is a source of ineﬃ-
ciency. We note that ineﬃciencies may arise even in those cases in which it
is known for sure what the best alternative is.3 This observation is reminis-
cent of another celebrated result due to Akerlof (1970), the lemon’s problem.
2The bounds on transfers implied by ex post veto constraints would immediately deliver
an impossibility result in the almost independent case, by application of continuity argu-
ments, as in Robert (1991) who considers the case of limited liability and risk-aversion. See
also Laﬀont-Martimort (2000) for a diﬀerent approach based on collusion among agents.
3In our private value setup, such an impossibility result may only arise when the
distributions of private information are correlated among agents. If the distributions are
independent, ineﬃciencies may only arise when there is some uncertainty about what the
best alternative is (see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
3But, unlike Akerlof’ s lemon problem our setup is one with private values
and the logics between our and Akerlof’s results are completely diﬀerent.
2 Some illustrative applications
We consider three classes of situations: the seller/buyer problem, the public
good problem and a multi-person bargaining setup. In each situation, we
will show that under incomplete information if parties keep their right to
withdraw from the interaction until an explicit and complete deal is being
made - this will be referred to as a veto right - then ineﬃciencies are in-
evitable. Remarkably, the result holds true even if the private information
held by the various agents is correlated and whatever the degree of correla-
tion.
The seller/buyer problem: Agent 1, the seller, owns an object which
he considers selling to agent 2, the buyer. The seller’s valuation for the object
is given by vS; the buyer’s valuation for the object is given by vB.T h es e l l e r
knows his valuation vS but not that of the buyer vB.S y m m e t r i c a l l y , t h e
buyer knows her valuation vB, but not that of the seller vS.A g e n t s a l s o
know that (vB,v S) is drawn from a joint distribution with support on (0,v)2.
Correlations between vS and vB are ap r i o r iallowed.
We are interested in whether bargaining between the seller, the buyer
and possibly an intermediary might lead the good to be eﬃciently allocated,
i.e. to agent 1 (the seller) whenever vS >v B and to agent 2 (the buyer)
whenever vB >v S. We will show under fairly general conditions that if the
seller and the buyer can receive no subsidy ex post (i.e. the sum of side-
payments received by the two agents can never exceed 0)e ﬃciency cannot
be achieved whenever each agent must get at least his reservation utility in
any event (that is, in any event the seller must get at least vS and the buyer
m u s tg e ta tl e a s t0).
This ineﬃciency result is reminiscent of that of Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983), but our setup diﬀers from theirs in two fundamental respects.
First, we allow for correlations between the distributions of the seller’s and
4the buyer’s valuations, and the analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite does
not apply to the correlated case.4 Second, we require that the agents should
in any event approve the deal after the deal has been proposed. This is
not the usual assumption made in mechanism design; generally agents are
asked to decide whether or not to participate before knowing the terms of
the trade. Our assumption that agents must get their reservation utility in
any event is reminiscent of the idea of ex post participation constraint, but
it is not equivalent. In fact, ex post participations constraints are implied
by our veto right assumption, but the veto right constraints also aﬀect the
nature of the incentive constraints, since when considering a deviation an
agent should anticipate that he will always keep the option of getting his
reservation utility. We will elaborate on this point when we develop the
formalism in the next section.
The public good problem: Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v em u s td e c i d ew h e t h e r
or not to build a public good. There are n agents i =1 ,...n.T h e c o s t o f
the public good is C.A g e n t i values the public good at θi ∈ (θ,θ).E a c h
agent i knows the value of θi, but not of θj, j 6= i. Everybody knows that
(θ1,...,θn) is distributed according to a joint distribution on (θ,θ)n,a n d
we assume that n¯ θ − C ≤ θ − θ. That is, the maximum surplus from the
public good does not exceed the uncertainty about any agent’s valuation for
the public good.5 Here, again, we allow for any correlations between the
willingness to pay of the various agents. Eﬃciency would require to build
the public project whenever
P
i θi >C, and we assume that the community
cannot receive ex post subsidies (that is, the sum of ﬁnancial payments made
by the agents must be at least equal to the cost C of the public good).6
Our analysis will show that eﬃciency cannot be achieved whenever agents
4Virtually the whole mechanism design literature relying on Bayes-Nash implemen-
tation assumes that signals are independently distributed accross agents. Besides, the
results of Crémer and McLean or McAfee and Reny all suggest that in the correlated case
the ﬁrst-best can be achieved.
5This reﬂects the idea that a single agent’s lack of enthusiasm for the public project
may undermine the desirability of making the public project.
6We also assume that building the public good requires the consent of every agent.
5have the right to veto the public project (thereby enjoying a reservation util-
ity of 0). As in the previous application, ineﬃciency is inevitable even if the
distributions of willingness to pay are correlated and whatever the degree of
correlation.
Bargaining with Outside Options: There are n parties i =1 ,2,...n
bargaining over the division of a pie of size V . Each party i has an outside
option wi where wi ∈ [0,V]. That is, if the parties do not reach an agree-
ment, party i gets wi.T h ev a l u e so fw =( w1,w 2,...w n) are not commonly
known. Party i (but not party j, j 6= i) knows the realization of wi.W e
let g(w) denote the joint density of w on [0,V]n.E ﬃciency requires that an
agreement be reached when
P
i wi <V but not when
P
i wi >V.
Suppose that no subsidy can be received ex post. That is, in case of
agreement the sum of payments received by all parties cannot exceed the
size of the pie V . We will show that eﬃciency cannot be achieved whenever
parties can at any point in time leave the bargaining table thereby enjoying
their outside option. Again, our result applies even if the distributions of
outside options are correlated and whatever the degree of correlation.
3T h e I n e ﬃciency Result
We will state our impossibility result in the bargaining with outside option
application. We will later show how the other applications can be dealt with
using the analysis of the bargaining with outside option application.
The bargaining protocols. A bargaining protocol is a process that gen-
erates a non-binding proposal, as a function of messages or information
transmitted between parties and/or to a third party. Speciﬁcally, a non-
binding proposal consists of a decision whether or not to share the pie,
combined with tentative transfers. We assume that (i) ﬁnal implementation
requires ratiﬁcation by all parties, and (ii) each party may quit bargaining
at any stage, including right before ratiﬁcation. These bargaining protocols
capture bargaining situations in which tentative agreements are generated
6by agents who do not have the power to commit to make transfers in the
course of bargaining. We will also assume that no third party can subsidize
the bargaining parties, thus leading to a no subsidy constraint.
We will refer to such situations as non-binding bargaining protocols, as
the parties are assumed to keep their veto right until a complete agreement
is ratiﬁed by all parties.
In the mechanism design language to be developed next, the possibility
of vetoing the proposal will imply (but will not be equivalent to assuming)
that ex post participation constraints must be satisﬁed. We will further
illustrate the diﬀerences between ex post participation constraints and ex
post veto constraints (see subsection 5.3).
The main result. The following result summarizes a striking result that
will be proven later on:
Theorem 1: Let Γv = {w =( w1,...w n) |
P
i wi <v ,w i > 0}, ﬁx
M and m>0, and consider the class GM,m of distributions with
compact support in Rn
+, that are bounded (by M), positive (no
smaller than m>0) and smooth (with derivatives bounded by
M) on their support.7 There exists ε such that for any g ∈ GM,m
and any v ≥ V − ε, if the support of g contains Γv,t h e ni n e ﬃ-
ciencies must arise in equilibrium in any non-binding bargaining
protocol.
O b s e r v et h a to u ri n e ﬃciency result holds if the support of g coincides
with ΓV in which case it is known for sure that an agreement is beneﬁcial.
It also holds for all distributions (correlated or not) with full support on
[0,V]
n.
At this point, it may be worth stressing a few notable diﬀerences with
the celebrated impossibility results obtained by Akerlof (1969) and Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983).
Akerlof (1969) considered a bargaining problem between a buyer and a
seller. The seller is privately informed about the quality of the good, and
7By smooth, we mean that g is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to each wi ,
i =1 ,...n on the support of g.
7the quality aﬀects the valuations of both the seller and the buyer. Moreover,
the buyer is assumed to value the good more than the seller whatever the
quality. In a beautiful and simple example, Akerlof shows that no trade can
take place in equilibrium. Consider the result of Theorem 1 with a support
of g that coincides with ΓV . As in Akerlof’s example, there is no uncertainty
as to which alternative is best: an agreement is always beneﬁcial. However,
while Akerlof’s model and logics crucially depend on the common value
character of the payoﬀ speciﬁcation (i.e., the private information held by
the seller aﬀects the buyer’s valuation), our model is one of private values,
that is, each party’s private information is irrelevant to determine the payoﬀ
of the other party in the various alternatives.8 Thus, the logics of our result
is radically diﬀerent from that of Akerlof.9
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) considered a bargaining problem be-
tween a seller and a buyer who are assumed to know their valuation of the
good. Hence it is a private value setup like our model. But, Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983)’s impossibility result crucially hinges on the facts that
(1) the supports of valuations of the seller and of the buyer overlap - hence
it is not common knowledge who values the good most, and (2) the distri-
butions of seller and buyer’s valuations are independent. This should be
contrasted with our setup in which the distributions of outside options are
not independent and there may be no uncertainty as to which alternative
is best.10 Our result can be viewed as providing a considerable generaliza-
8In the agreement alternative there is no uncertainty. In the outside option alternative,
each party i is assumed to know wi.
9Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) provide an interesting private (and correlated) value
example in which it is common knowledge that the provision of a public good is eﬃcient,
and yet, no mechanism with ﬁxed limited liability permits to implement it when the
number of agent is large enough (the probability even tends to 0 as the number of agents
tend to inﬁnity). By contrast, our result does not rely on the number of agents being
large, and the limited liability constraint is replaced by the veto constraint.
10If we assume that the distributions of wi, i =1 ,2 are independent from each other,
then we have a result similar to that of Myerson and Satterthwaite. That is, as soon as
Pr(w1 + w2 >V ) > 0 there are ineﬃciencies, but not otherwise. To see the Myerson-
Satterthwaite type of ineﬃciency, consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism such
that the transfers associated with the outside option alternative are set to zero (hence the
participation constraints are automatically satisﬁed). The associated transfer received by
8tion (to the case of correlated distributions) of the fundamental insight that
private information is a source of ineﬃciencies in bargaining (non-binding
protocols).
It should be mentioned that the veto right that parties can exert at any
time is essential for the derivation of our result. If we had allowed parties to
surrender their veto rights (after joining the mechanism), then only interim
participation constraints would need to be satisﬁed (as in most mechanism
design works using Bayesian Nash implementation). But, ex post veto con-
straints somehow reduce the transfers that can be made for the various
realizations of the outside options. This in turn translates into unavoid-
able ineﬃciencies (despite the correlation), as we show. Observe that our
impossibility result does not solely arise for distributions of outside options
that are nearly independent. It arises for virtually all distributions whatever
their degree of correlation. Thus, our result goes far beyond the simple ob-
servation that ex post veto constraints impose a continuous transition from
the independent distribution case to the correlated distribution case (due
to the induced bounds on transfers). It establishes in a strong way that
private information even if correlated among agents is an inevitable source
of ineﬃciency in non-binding bargaining protocols.
We have already mentioned that the requirement of ex post veto con-
straints is diﬀerent from the more usual one of ex post participation con-
straints. To illustrate the diﬀerence we will note that when the support
of the distribution g(·) coincides with ΓV , ex post participation constraints
alone (together with the Bayesian Nash incentive constraints and the ex
post no subsidy constraints) is consistent with eﬃciency (see subsection
party i in the agreement alternative should be set equal to ti = V − b wj where b wj denotes
the announcement of party j’s outside option. It is readily veriﬁed that if the eﬃcienct
allocation is chosen on the basis of the announced types, it is a dominant strategy to
report honestly his true type. The problem is about the budget constraint. Whenever
the agreement is optimal, i.e. w1 + w2 >V, the total transfer recievd by parties 1 and 2
should be t1 +t2 = V +(V −w1 −w2) >V. Hence, the budget constraint cannot be met
in this mechanism. By the allocation equivalence principle, it is also immediate to check
that no mechanism that induces eﬃciency can satisfy both the participation constraints
of the parties and the budget constraint. (See Williams (1999) or Krishna-Perry (2000)
for a related point in the original setup of Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)).
95.3). Contrast this with the result of Theorem 1. The essential reason for
this diﬀerence is that veto rights can be exerted oﬀ the equilibrium path in
o u rs e t u p ,w h i c hi nt u r na ﬀects the form of the incentive constraints (see
below).
4 The Mechanism Design Approach
To analyze our bargaining problem it is convenient to develop a mechanism
design approach. We ﬁrst develop some preliminary deﬁnitions, and then
develop our main result. Applications are discussed next.
4.1 Preliminaries
In order to prove the Theorem, it is useful to use a mechanism design ap-
proach. The revelation principle tells us that there is no loss of generality in
looking at direct truthful mechanisms (we will be more explicit about how
to apply the revelation principle in the next section). That is, any equilib-
rium outcome of any game (whether static or dynamic) can be viewed as the
(equilibrium) outcome of a static game in which parties are asked to simul-
taneously reveal their private information and each party ﬁnds it optimal
to report her true information assuming other parties do. Thus, proving
that no direct truthful mechanism allows to induce an eﬃcient outcome is
enough to prove that no mechanism whatsoever permits to get an eﬃcient
outcome.
Formally, a direct mechanism takes the form that each party i is asked
to report a valuation b wi. Based on the proﬁle of reports b w it is decided
whether an agreement should be proposed where the agreement includes
the speciﬁcations of monetary transfers ti(b w) to each party i.
Before an agreement is eﬀectively implemented we assume that each
party has the option to quit, thereby enjoying her outside option - such a
possibility will be referred to as a veto right option and will in turn give
rise to veto right constraints. More precisely, the veto right option can be
modelled as resulting in a ratiﬁcation stage: after the proposal is made,
parties sequentially11 decide whether they accept the agreement or not. If
11The sequentiality is only meant to avoid coordination problems that would be caused
10all parties accept, the agreement is implemented; otherwise parties get their
outside options.
The analysis of the ratiﬁcation stage is pretty straightforward. Based
on the proposal (t1(b w),...t n(b w)) party i with outside option wi says ”yes”
if ti(b w) >w i and ”no” if ti(b w) <w i.12 The key feature of the ratiﬁcation
game is that a party with outside option wi can always secure a payoﬀ of wi
whatever the proﬁle b w of announcements made at the announcement stage
by deciding to reject the agreement at the ratiﬁcation stage. This feature
referred to as the veto right constraint will play a major role in our analysis
( a n dw i l lb em e ti na n yg a m ei nw h i c hp a r t i e sm a yd e c i d et oo p to u ta ta n y
point in time).
We also assume that our n parties can receive no subsidy ex post. That




ti(b w) ≤ V. (1)
Observe that we allow for situations in which the entire pie V is not fully
distributed to the agents, i.e.
P
i ti(b w) <V. T h i sa l l o w su st oc o v e ra p -
plications in which a third party (say an intermediary) may extract some
surplus from oﬀering a division of the pie.13
We consider direct mechanisms of the above form in which it is an equi-
librium to report the true private information b wi = wi at the announcement
stage. That is, for every party i we let Ui(b wi;wi) denote the expected payoﬀ
obtained by party i in the above game when party i’s outside option is wi,
party i’s announcement is b wi and party i expects other parties j, j 6= i to
report truthfully b wj = wj; and we require that
Ui(wi;wi) ≥ Ui(b wi;wi). (2)
by the simultaneous refusal of several agents.
12Cases in which ti(b w)=wi will play no role in our analysis.
13Third parties are often thought of as helping achieving better outcomes in bargaining,
and many practical negotiations do include the presence of third parties or mediators or
arbitrators. It is thus of importance to be able to cover such applications. Of course, our
ineﬃciency result holds a fortiori is we further impose that the surplus should be entirely
distributed, i.e.
P
i ti(b w)=V .
11We ask ourselves whether there can be a mechanism satisfying the above
constraints and at the same time results in an eﬃcient outcome whatever
the realizations w =( wi)i=n
i=1 of the outside options.
In our bargaining setup eﬃciency means that an agreement should be
reached when
P
i wi <V and the outside option should be chosen when
P
i wi >V . To simplify the exposition (even though this is inessential
for the derivation of our result) we will require that an agreement be also
reached whenever
P
i wi = V .14
Ex post veto constraints imply ex post participation constraints. Thus
assuming parties report truthfully and agreement should be reached, each
party should get at least her outside option. Formally, let Γg denote the
support of g.F o r e ﬃciency to be possible, it should be that for any w ∈
Γg ∩ ΓV , an agreement is proposed and satisﬁes:
ti(w) ≥ wi. (3)
But, ex post veto constraints also have an eﬀect on the analysis of the
incentive constraints (2). Still assuming that eﬃciency can be achieved,
suppose that party i makes a false announcement b wi. Assuming other parties
j report their true type b wj = wj, an agreement should be proposed and
accepted by all j 6= i whenever (b wi,w −i) ∈ Γg ∩ ΓV (note that for such
an announcement proﬁle (3) applies to each j 6= i). Party i should agree
as well whenever ti(b wi,w −i) >w i and say no whenever ti(b wi,w −i) <w i ,
thereby resulting in a payoﬀ of max(ti(b wi,w −i),w i). It follows that (noting








wigi (w−i | wi)dw−i
where gi(·|wi) denotes the marginal density of w−i given wi.
On the other hand, making the true announcement b wi = wi and assum-
ing eﬃciency can be achieved when everybody reports truthfully, one should
14This plays no role in our analysis because events such that
P











We will show that the above constraints (1)(2)(3)(4)(5) cannot be simul-
taneously satisﬁed, thereby showing our impossibility result.
4.2 Getting to the Ineﬃciency Result
The veto right constraint, together with the ex post no subsidy constraint,
imply the following set of inequalities on transfers:15




Our approach consists in showing that incentive compatibility conditions





That is, each party i must always get the residual surplus generated by the
agreement assuming that all other parties are set to their reservation utility
(their outside option payoﬀ). Of course, this cannot be, as such transfer
rules would result in the violation of the ex post no subsidy constraint for
quite a range of outside option proﬁles (think of wj being close to 0 for
every j; all transfers ti should then be close to V , leading to a violation of
the no subsidy constraint). Thus, we will have shown that no mechanism
whatsoever can implement the eﬃcient allocation in our setup.
We will now explain why incentive compatibility conditions lead to equal-
ity (7).
A preliminary intuition.
To ﬁx ideas, we consider two players, and examine a case where outside
options have full support over the ﬁnite grid
G = {(k1V/N,k2V/N),k i ∈ {0,...,N}}.
15The second inequalities follows from ti(w)+
P
j6=i tj(w) ≤ V and tj(w) ≥ wj for all j.
13This case is not covered by our main Theorem, but it will permit us to
provide a simple intuition as to why our result holds.
Because the distribution over outside options has full support over ΓV ∩
G, an agreement should be proposed in any event where (w1,w 2) ∈ ΓV ∩G,
that is, in any event where k1 + k2 ≤ N. We wish to show that in any such
event,
t1(w1,w 2)=V − w2.( 8 )
When k1 = N and k2 =0(and more generally in any event where
k1+k2 = N), player 1’s outside option w1 coincides with the residual surplus
V −w2, so that there are no other choices than setting the transfer t1 equal
to V − w2.
Now ﬁx k0
1 ≤ N, and assume that for all k1 ≥ k0
1 and k2 ≤ N − k1,
equality (8) holds. We will show below that equality (8) must also hold for
all k1 ≥ k0
1 − 1 and k2 ≤ N − k1, thereby concluding the argument.
Agent 1 with outside option w1 =( k0
1 −1)V/N could consider reporting
b w1 = k0
1V/N. For all realizations of w2 that fall strictly below V −w1 (that
is, for all realizations k2 ≤ N − k0
1), the induction hypothesis tells us that
player 1 should get V −w2, which is in any case the maximum payoﬀ player 1
can hope to get. Now for the realizations of w2 that coincide with or exceed
V − w1 (that is, when k2 ≥ N − k0
1 +1 ), player 1 cannot hope to get more
than w1, whether an agreement is proposed or not.
It follows that the announcement b w1 allows player 1 to extract all the
residual surplus, hence the only way to provide player 1 with incentives to
report w1 truthfully is to give him that surplus even when he announces w1,
that is, to set the transfer t1 equal to V −w2 for all realizations of w2 below
or equal to V − w1.
A general argument in the diﬀerentiable case.
The above argument while very simple relies on a speciﬁc discretization
of the type space, and it does not extend in a straightforward way to other
discretizations. We now provide an argument for the continuous type case.
We will assume in the main text that the support of g contains ΓV .T of a c i l -
itate exposition, we will also assume that transfers are diﬀerentiable. In the
Appendix, we show how the argument extends to possibly non-diﬀerentiable
14transfer functions, and to the case where g contains Γv with v<V, v close
to V .
Because the distribution over outside options has a support that contains
ΓV , an agreement should be proposed in any event where w ∈ ΓV .
We ﬁrst derive a condition on transfers implied by incentive compatibility
conditions. Party i should prefer reporting he is of type wi rather than
of type b wi = wi + ε. When he reports b wi (rather than wi), he gains16
ti(b wi,w −i) − ti(wi,w −i) whenever (b wi,w −i) ∈ ΓV , and he loses no more
than ti(wi,w −i)−wi in events where w ∈ ΓV and (b wi,w −i) / ∈ ΓV .( I no t h e r
events, there is no loss because he cannot expect more than his outside
option payoﬀ.) Incentive compatibility conditions thus require that
Z
(b wi,w−i)∈ΓV






When (b wi,w −i) / ∈ ΓV ,t h es u r p l u si sa tm o s te q u a lt oε.S i n c e ti(w) − wi
cannot exceed the surplus, the right hand side of (9) is comparable to ε2.
Dividing by ε on both sides and taking the limit of this comparison as ε





(wi,w −i)g(wi,w −i)dw−i ≤ 0. (10)
Remark: This inequality already implies that direct mecha-
nisms with monotone transfers cannot achieve eﬃciency. But,
a priori it does not rule out the possibility that more elaborate
transfer schemes achieve eﬃciency.







wj − ti(wi,w −i))g(wi,w −i)dw−i (11)
We will prove that Hi(wi)=0for all wi ∈ (0,V).G i v e n t h a t V −
P
j6=i wj − ti(wi,w −i) ≥ 0 is non-negative (we know from (6) that V −
P
j6=i wj is the maximum transfer that party i can hope to get when each
16ti(b wi,w −i) − ti(wi,w −i) could be negative; so it could be a loss.
15party j’s outside option is given by wj), we will deduce that for all (wi,w −i) ∈
ΓV :










































∂wi(wi,w −i) ≥ 0 for all wi ∈ (0,V),( 1 2 )a l l o w su st oc o n -
clude that
dHi(wi)
dwi ≥ 0 for all wi ≤ V. Since Hi(wi) is non-negative every-
where (by the no ex post subsidy requirement) and since Hi(V )=0 ,w e
conclude that Hi(wi)=0everywhere, as desired.
In the general case where the variations of g may be arbitrary, observe
that the fact that g has a strictly positive lower bound on its support and
that g varies smoothly with wi guarantee that there must exist a constant
a (possibly negative) such that for all (wi,w −i) ∈ ΓV :
∂g
∂wi
(wi,w −i) >a g (wi,w −i).
Given the non-negativeness of V −
P





17The term corresponding to the variation of the domain of integration does not ap-
pear because at the boundary the veto constraint together with the ex post no sub-
sidy constraint imply that for w such that
P
j wj = V , ti(wi,w −i)=wi and thus
V −
P
j6=i wj − ti(wi,w −i)=0 .
16Thus, Hi(V ) ≥ exp(a(V − wi))Hi(wi).S i n c e Hi(V )=0 ,a n dHi(wi) ≥ 0,
we conclude that Hi(wi)=0 ,a sd e s i r e d .
In the above argument we have restricted attention to diﬀerentiable
transfer functions and we have assumed that the support of g contains
ΓV . In the appendix, we generalize thea r g u m e n tt ot h ec a s eo fp o s s i b l y
non-diﬀerentiable transfer functions and to the case where the support of g
contains Γv with v possibly less than V but close to V , thereby providing a
complete proof for our Theorem.
4.3 On General Game Forms
The revelation principle:
Let us see now why the analysis presented above applies to any non-
binding protocol in which parties may at any point in time get their outside
option if they wish. First, observe that the above analysis can be extended to
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h et r a n s f e rf u n c t i o ni snon-deterministic. This is because
if eﬃciency could be obtained while satisfying the veto constraint, the ex
post no subsidy constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint with
a non-deterministic transfer scheme e ti, it could a fortiori be obtained with
a deterministic transfer scheme ti deﬁned as the expectation of e ti over the
stochastic element in the transfer scheme.18
Next, consider any non-binding bargaining protocol, an equilibrium of
the game associated with this protocol, and assume that it involves no in-
eﬃciencies. Denote by σi(wi) the strategy used by party i in equilibrium,
when his outside option is wi. To each strategy proﬁle (σi(wi),σ−i(w−i)),
we may associate a probability that an agreement is proposed in stage k,
and distributions of payments e ti |(wi,w−i) in the agreement scenario. Assum-
18More formally, deﬁne the deterministic mechanism as follows: make a proposal if
and only if b w ∈ ΓV ∩ Γ
g and a proposal is made with probability 1 under the stochastic
mechanism, and let this proposal be deﬁned as ti(b w)=E[e ti | b w].
If the stochastic mechanism has the desired properties, then a proposal is made (and
accepted) with probability one when w ∈ ΓV ∩ Γ
g.S o ti is deﬁned on ΓV ∩ Γ
g.I t i s
immediate to check that the ex post participation constraint and the ex post no subsidy
constraint are satisﬁed. For the incentive constraint, note that E[max(e ti,w i) | (b wi,w −i)] ≥
max(E(e ti | (b wi,w −i)),w i), so if the stochastic mechanism is incentive compatible, the
deterministic one is incentive compatible as well.
17ing delay is costly, for the equilibrium to involve no eﬃciency, we should
have that an agreement should be reached in stage 1 with probability one
whenever (wi,w −i) ∈ Γg ∩ ΓV , and since the agreement should not be ve-
toed in equilibrium, we should have for (wi,w −i) ∈ Γg ∩ΓV , and all transfer
realizations e ti in the support of e ti |(wi,w−i),
e ti ≥ wi.
Consider now the strategy that consists in following σi(b wi) during the ﬁrst
stage, and to exercise the outside option if no agreement is proposed by the
end of this stage, or if the proposed agreement entails receiving a payment
smaller than wi. The expected payoﬀ associated with that strategy when









wigi (w−i | wi)dw−i
Because strategies are in equilibrium, the deviations above must be deterred,
which implies that conditions Ui(wi;wi) ≥ Ui(b wi;wi) hold for all wi, b wi.I t
follows that the direct mechanism deﬁn e db yt h et r a n s f e rr u l e se ti must be
an eﬃcient direct truthful mechanism with veto rights. But, we have seen
that no such mechanism exists, thereby showing that no equilibrium of any
non-binding bargaining protocol whatsoever can induce an eﬃcient outcome.
Assuming it is common knowledge that an agreement is beneﬁcial:
One important insight of Myerson-Satterthwaite in the uncorrelated case
is that ineﬃciencies arise when and only when it is not common knowledge
which alternative is best. In contrast, under the assumption of Theorem 1,
ineﬃciencies arise whether or not it is common knowledge that agreement
is beneﬁcial. But, even more is true. Consider any distribution g for which
it is not known for sure that an agreement is beneﬁcial, i.e. Γg " ΓV .I t
is easy to see that if the parties were told whether or not the agreement
is beneﬁcial, it would not help them increase expected welfare (in the best
18non-binding protocol mechanism).19 Intuitively, the veto constraint and the
no subsidy constraint together imply that in any event where the agreement
is not beneﬁcial, each party must get his outside option payoﬀ and no more:
so it is irrelevant when players learn it.
Relatedly, a simple two-stage procedure can be used to elicit information
about whether the agreement is beneﬁcial, as explained below.
We start from a situation in which it is not known for sure that an
agreement is beneﬁcial, i.e. Γg " ΓV , and we consider a direct truthful
mechanism, deﬁned by a proposal schedule o(b w) specifying a probability
of agreement proposal and transfer functions as a function of the proﬁle
of announcement. After a proposal is made, parties sequentially report if
they accept the proposal or if they prefer going for their outside option.
Remember that we also assume that no subsidy ex post is allowed, which
places some constraints on the set of admissible proposals (i.e., in case of
agreement, the sum of transfers cannot exceed V ).
Consider now the following two-stage procedure. In stage 1, each party
i simultaneously announces b w
(1)
i (say, to a third party). If an agreement is




i ≤ V ) one moves to stage 2. Otherwise, parties are requested to go
for their outside option. In stage 2, each party i simultaneously announces
b w
(2)
i . On the basis of stage 2 announcements, the proposal schedule o(b w(2))
as deﬁned in the original direct truthful mechanism is made to the parties.
Then parties report sequentially if they accept or refuse the proposal.
It is easy to check that in this two-stage mechanism it is an equilibrium
for each party i to report truthfully in both stages, i.e. b w
(1)
i = b w
(2)
i =
wi.20 Thus, in this equilibrium, stage 1 permits to elicit information about
19Indeed, assume by contradiction that there were a direct truthful mechanism gener-
ating a strictly higher expected welfare when parties are ﬁrst told whether the agreement
is beneﬁcial (so that players now know that outside options are distributed on Γ
g ∩ ΓV ).
The mechanism stipulating the same transfers and allocations when b w belongs to Γ
g∩ΓV ,
and no agreement and no transfer otherwise remains incentive compatible whether or not




i wi >V the veto right coupled with the absence of subsidy ex
post forces each party i to get exactly her outside option. Thus, separating ﬁrst the
19whether the agreement is beneﬁcial, so that whenever one reaches stage 2 it
is common knowledge that an agreement is beneﬁcial. This comment thus
gives some appeal to a practice often used in the decisions about whether or
not to implement public projects, which generally includes a ﬁrst stage in
which investigations are made solely to determine whether the public project
is worthwhile or not.
5 Discussion
5.1 Other Applications
Given that our results have been stated in the bargaining with outside option
application, it may be worth explaining how our ineﬃciency result applies
to the seller/buyer problem and to the public good problem set in Section
2.
The seller/buyer problem: Call pi(b v) the payment to agent i, i =
S,B (it may be negative) in exchange for a trade between the seller and
the buyer after the announcements b vB and b vS are made by the buyer and
the seller, respectively. Ex post veto rights mean that in any event the
situations in which there is no other choice than getting the outside option has no eﬀect
on the overall parties’ incentives to report truthfully their private information.
More formally, assume in our two-stage procedure that all parties j, j 6= i report their
true outside option in both stages 1 and 2, and let (b w
(1)
i , b w
(2)
i ) denote the reports of party
i in stages 1 and 2, respectively. One might worry that party i’s stage 1 announcement
allows party i to gain extra information on parties j, j 6= i private information in case
one moves to stage 2, which party i could exploit in stage 2. We claim however that no
reports (b w
(1)
i , b w
(2)
i ) can do strictly better than (wi,w i) for party i, given that reporting the
truth in the original truthful mechanism is an equilibrium. Suppose by contradiction that
(b w
(1)
i , b w
(2)
i ) does strictly better. If b w
(1)
i ≤ b w
(2)
i ,p a r t yi g e t st h es a m ep a y o ﬀ as the one he
would have obtained by announcing b wi = b w
(2)
i in the original direct truthful mechanism.
So the deviation to b wi = b w
(2)
i in the original direct truthful mechanism should have been
strictly beneﬁcial. If b w
(1)
i > b w
(2)
i ,t h e np l a y e ri gets even less than the payoﬀ he would
have obtained by announcing b wi = b w
(2)
i in the original direct truthful mechanism, because
he only obtain wi in events where
P




j6=i wj + b w
(2)
i .S oa fortiori,
ad e v i a t i o nb wi = b w
(2)
i in the original direct truthful mechanism should have been strictly
beneﬁcial.
20seller must receive at least her valuation vS in case of transaction (that is,
pS(b v) ≥ vS in case of trade) and that the buyer must get at least 0 in any
event (that is, vB + pB(b v) ≥ 0 in case of trade). The ex post no subsidy
constraint means that the sum of monetary transfers received by the seller
and the buyer cannot exceed 0 (pS + pB ≤ 0).
This trade problem can be cast into a bargaining problem with outside
options, where the size of the pie V , outside options and transfers are deﬁned
as follows: V = v, wS = vS, wB = v − vB, tS(w)=pS(v) and tB(w)=
¯ v+pB(v).I ti sr e a d i l yv e r i ﬁed that the ineﬃciency result in the seller/buyer
problem is equivalent to the ineﬃciency result in this bargaining with outside
option problem.21
The public good problem: Let pi(b θ) denote the payment requested
from agent i when the proﬁle of announcements is b θ. The ex post veto right
means that an agent i with type θi will refuse to make any payment greater
than θi. The no subsidy constraint means that for any b θ one should have
P
i pi(b θ) ≥ C.E ﬃciency means that the public good should be implemented
whenever
P
i θi >C .
No mechanism whatsoever permits the implementation of the eﬃcient
decision rule whenever (θ1,...θn) is distributed on (θ,θ)n w h e r ew ea s s u m e
that 0 <n ¯ θ − C<θ − θ and the density is assumed to be smooth and
bounded by a strictly positive number on its support.
This can be seen as a corollary of Theorem 1 where we deﬁne the bar-
gaining problem V = nθ − C, with outside options wi = θ − θi.
The transfers in the bargaining problem ti(b w) should be identiﬁed with
θ − pi(b θ), and it is readily veriﬁed that the incentive constraints and veto
right constraints in the bargaining problem are identical to the incentive
constraints and veto right constraints in the public good problem, thereby
establishing the ineﬃciency in the public good decision problem as a corol-
lary of Theorem 1.
21Indeed, wS + wB <V is equivalent to vS <v B; the no subsidy constraint tS(w)+
tB(w) ≤ V is equivalent to pS(v)+pB(v) ≤ 0; the ex post participation contraints
tS(w) ≥ wS and tB(w) ≥ wB are respectively equivalent to pS(v) ≥ vS and pB(v)+vB ≥ 0.
215.2 Diﬀerences with Crémer-McLean
Correlations between the distributions of outside options of the various par-
ties were allowed in our setup. It may be instructive to review how the
analysis of Crémer-McLean (which was extended to cover the continuous
type case by McAfee and Reny (1992)) would apply to our setup.
To ﬁx ideas, assume that the support of g coincides with ΓV and that
g is bounded from below by a strictly positive number on its support (this
ensures that there must be some correlation between the distributions of
outside options of the parties).
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism can be described as follows. Each
party i is asked to report her outside option b wi.I f
P
i b wi >V parties are
requested to go for their outside option with no transfer being made. If
P
i b wi ≤ V , an agreement is proposed in which party i receives V −
P
j6=i b wj.
The payments ensure that party i’s interest is aligned with the social interest.
Ignoring the participation constraints, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
party i to report her true outside b wi = wi. Let us denote by wi +πi(wi) the
expected payoﬀ obtained by party i that results from the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism in which participation is assumed to be compulsory. That
is, in addition to wi party i receives πi(wi) in expectation.
As noted by Clarke and Groves, the above mechanism continues to have
its nice truthtelling incentives, even if one subtracts from party i ’s payment
a transfer function that applies to all possible alternatives (i.e. agreement
or outside option) and that depends solely on the reports made by parties j
other than i. Let us denote this extra transfer by zi(b w−i). So based on the
announcements, if the outside option is chosen party i gets −zi(b w−i) and if
the agreement is chosen party i gets V −
P
j6=i b wj − zi(b w−i).
Following Cremer and McLean the next step is to observe that when
the distributions of wi are correlated it is possible to ﬁnd zi functions such
that22
πi(wi)=Ew−i(zi(w−i) | wi). (13)
22Under our assumptions, the support of outside options is monotonic and thus the
existence of such functions is automatically obtained (see McAfee and Reny 1992 for a
general analysis of the continuous type case).
22This observation leads to the well known full rent extraction result. Suppose
an intermediary were to organize the bargaining between parties i =1 ,...n.
Suppose further that each party i must decide at the interim stage (when
she knows wi only) whether she agrees or not to participate in the mecha-
nism, but after she agrees party i has no right to leave the mechanism (this
is a key diﬀerence with our setup in which party i is assumed to keep a
right to veto the agreement at any point in time). Then by proposing the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism augmented by the zi transfer functions,
the intermediary can ensure that each party i exactly gets her outside option
payoﬀ by participating. So every party i will choose to participate and the
intermediary will keep the entire surplus for himself.
Since the outcome of this mechanism is eﬃcient (the agreement is reached
whenever it is eﬃcient), one may wonder how this result relates to our impos-
sibility result (Theorem 1). There are essentially two points of departure.
First, as repeatedly emphasized we assume that parties keep the right to
veto the agreement. Thus, if the intermediary had to let the parties opt out
whenever they wish he could not extract a positive payment zi(b w−i) > 0
from party i. This in turn considerably limits the set of admissible trans-
fers available to the intermediary and it makes it impossible to satisfy (13).
Second, we assume that parties can receive no subsidy ex post (i.e. in the
agreement scenario the sum of transfers received by parties cannot exceed
V ). In the Cremer-McLean mechanism, the fact that parties are set to their
outside option utility ensures that ex ante parties receive no subsidy, but
there is no guarantee that there is no subsidy ex post. We will illustrate later
how eﬃciency can sometimes be obtained in our setup if we only require that
there is no subsidy ex ante (while maintaining the veto right constraints).
Another notable diﬀerence between the Crémer-McLean mechanism and
our approach is that Crémer-McLean rely on mechanisms implementable in
dominant strategy whereas our notion of incentive constraints is Bayesian
(or interim) rather than in dominant strategy.
In some setups it is believed that there is no major diﬀerence between
Nash-Bayes implementation and dominant strategy implementation. But,
this is not so in our setup with veto rights and no subsidy ex post.
23Contrasting Nash-Bayes implementation with dominant strategy imple-
mentation
To illustrate the claim that Nash-Bayes implementation and dominant
strategy implementation do diﬀer, we ﬁrst establish an impossibility result
for mechanisms implementable in dominant strategy. Of course, this is no
surprise given the stronger result of impossibility for Bayes-Nash implemen-
tation. But, this will allow us in turn to illustrate that sometimes eﬃciency
can be obtained with Nash-Bayes implementation whereas it is impossible
with dominant strategy implementation.
Formally, let Ui(b wi,w −i;wi) denote party i’s ex post payoﬀ when party
i announces he is of type b wi while every party j, j = i,−i is of type wj.
Implementation in dominant strategy implies that the following constraints
hold: for all wi, b wi, wj,
Ui(wi,w j;wi) ≥ Ui(b wi,w j;wi). (14)
Besides these new constraints we still assume that parties have veto rights
and that there is no subsidy ex post. We have:











The eﬃcient outcome cannot be implemented in dominant strategy while
satisfying the veto right constraints and the (ex post) no subsidy constraint
whenever v>V / n .
Proof. Suppose nv > V and eﬃciency can be achieved. This implies
that for any (wi,w −i) ∈ Γv, an agreement is proposed and ti(wi,w −i) ≥ wi.
This implies
Ui(wi,w −i;wi)=ti(wi,w −i)
and, for all b wi <v−
P
j6=i wj,
Ui(b wi,w −i;wi)=m a x ( ti(b wi,w −i),w i)
Constraints (14) thus imply that for all b wi <v−
P
j6=i wj,
ti(wi,w −i) ≥ max(ti(b wi,w −i),w i)
24hence, since ti(b wi,w −i) ≥ b wi when b wi <v−
P
j6=i wj,




It thus follows that
X
i
ti(0) ≥ nv > V ,
and the no subsidy constraint cannot be satisﬁed.
Remark: Note that this result does not follow from Hagerty-Rogerson
(1987), who establish a connection between ﬁxed price mechanisms and
mechanisms implementable in dominant strategy in the case of ex post bud-
get balanced transfers. Here, we only require that parties receive no subsidy
ex post, not that the entire surplus be split between the two parties.23
W en o wt u r nt oa ne x a m p l ei nw h i c he ﬃciency can be obtained un-
der Bayes-Nash implementation even if g has full support on Γv for some
v>V / n , thus showing that in our context with veto rights and ex post no
subsidy, eﬃciency may sometimes be obtained with Bayes-Nash implemen-
tation while it cannot with dominant strategy implementation.
Assume there are two parties i =1 ,2 and consider the bargaining proto-
col deﬁned as follows (in the rest of the paper, this protocol will be referred
to as the Nash Bargaining protocol). In the ﬁrst stage, each party i, i =1 ,2
simultaneously announces an outside option b wi. If these announcements are
compatible, that is, if the sum b w1 + b w2 does not exceed V , an agreement
is proposed, along with transfers τ1(b w1, b w2) and τ2(b w1, b w2) chosen so that
each party i obtains, in addition to b w1,h a l ft h es u r p l u sV − b w1− b w2,t h a ti s
τi(b w1, b w2)=b wi +
V − b w1 − b w2
2
=
V + b wi − b wj
2
In case the sum b w1 + b w2 exceeds V , bargaining stops, and each party
gets his outside option. In the second stage, parties sequentially report if
they accept the deal. If both parties say ”yes”, the deal is implemented.
Otherwise, the outside option alternative is implemented.
Clearly, in the second stage, it is a dominant strategy for party i with
outside option wi to say ”yes” (respectively, ”no”) if τi >w i (respectively,
23In the no subsidy scenario, allocations other than those corresponding to ﬁxed sharing
rules can be implemented in dominant strategy.
25τi <w i). The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the
outside option announcement stage.
Proposition 2 Suppose (w1,w 2) is uniformly distributed on
Γv = {(w1,w 2) | w1 + w2 ≤ v}.
with 3V/4 ≤ v ≤ V . The following is an equilibrium of the outside option








There is agreement when w1 + w2 ≤ 3V
4 . The outside option alternative is
implemented when w1 + w2 > 3V
4 .
So one Corollary of Proposition 2 is that when v =3 V/4,f u l le ﬃciency
can be obtained. This shows that the best (i.e. welfare maximizing) mecha-
nism need not in general be implementable in dominant strategy (see Propo-
sition 1 and note that 3V/4 >V/ 2).
5.3 Ex post participation versus ex post veto constraints.
In this Subsection, we examine the role of ex post veto constraints. To see
why these constraints play an important role in our analysis, we now relax
them and only impose the standard ex post participation constraints. In
a direct truthful mechanism that would be eﬃcient, ex post participation
constraints require that
ti(wi,w −i) ≥ wi for all i and (wi,w −i) ∈ ΓV .
In particular, they do not impose any constraints on transfers when an-
nouncement fall outside the support of g,w h i c h ,w ew i l la s s u m eh e r e ,c o i n -
cides with ΓV . So parties may be punished when announcements fall outside
the support of g.
To illustrate the implication of this observation, assume there are two
parties i =1 ,2 and consider the Nash bargaining protocol described earlier.
This protocol may be amended by assuming that whenever the announce-
ment proﬁle (b w1, b w2) lies outside ΓV , both players are severely punished,
26say by an amount equal to P. Then it is easy to check that when P is large
enough, each party has incentives to report his own outside option truth-
fully, and eﬃciency results. Ex post participation constraints are satisﬁed,
because for any possible realization of (w1,w 2),p a r t yi of type wi gets at
least wi. Hence ex post participation constraints alone are not suﬃcient to
undermine eﬃciency.
More generally, consider an arbitrary number n of parties and assume
that the support of outside options coincides with ΓV where g is bounded
from below by a strictly positive number on its support. Consider any proﬁle
of diﬀerentiable transfers ti(wi,w −i) satisfying
ti(wi,w −i) ≥ wi for all i and all (wi,w −i) ∈ ΓV ,a n d
wi → ti(wi,w −i) is increasing in wi for all (wi,w −i) in ΓV
We are going to show that it is possible to implement the eﬃcient outcome
(i.e agreement iﬀ w ∈ ΓV ). Indeed, choose P large, and set
ti(wi,w −i)=−P if (wi,w −i) / ∈ ΓV
Since wi → ti(wi,w −i) is increasing in wi, if all parties j 6= i report their
type truthfully, party i of type wi has no incentives to understate his out-
side option. He has no incentives to overstate his outside option when the
following inequalities hold for all b wi >w i
Z
(wi,w−i)∈ΓV
ti(wi,w −i)g(wi,w −i)dw−i ≥
Z
(b wi,w−i)∈ΓV













Let m be a lower bound on g and M an upper bound on ∂
∂witi and on g,
then inequalities (15) are satisﬁed when the following inequality holds:
M2V (b wi − wi) ≤ Pm(b wi − wi)
27Thus, picking P>M2V
m ensures that eﬃciency can be obtained if only
ex post participation constraints are required.
This result illustrates that ex post participation and ex post veto con-
straints are quite diﬀerent. Ex post participation imposes that in equilib-
rium, players do not regret not having exercised their outside option. In
case player i deviates however, he does not have the option of going out,
and a penalty may be imposed on him. In contrast, ex post veto constraints
capture the possibility that a party would use his outside option strategically
in the bargaining process, pretending to be another type, and yet keeping
the option of going out.
5.4 Ex post no subsidy versus Ex ante no subsidy.
So far we have assumed that parties could receive no subsidy ex post. One
may wonder what happens if we only require that the parties receive no
subsidy ex ante. We wish to illustrate here that for some distributions over
outside options, eﬃciency can be achieved while satisfying the ex post veto
constraints, if only the ex ante no subsidy constraint is required.
To this end, we assume there are two parties i =1 ,2, and we consider
a distribution over outside options deﬁned as follows.24 With probability
p>0, outside options are distributed according to a density g0 with full
support on ΓV . With probability 1 − p, outside options are distributed
uniformly on F = {(w1,V −w1),w 1 ∈ [0,V]}. We construct below transfers
that implement the eﬃcient outcome.
Speciﬁcally, we set
ti(w1,w 2)=wi when w1 + w2 <V
and
ti(w1,w 2)=wi + T(wi) when w1 + w2 = V
Intuitively, the idea is to subsidize agreement ex post by a substantial
amount T(wi) whenever the announcement falls on the frontier. When party
24The example falls outside the class of distributions covered in Theorem 1. Yet, we
conjecture that a slight modiﬁcation would allow us to provide an example falling in this
class.
28i overstates his outside option, and announces b wi >w i, he obtains a transfer
equal to b wi instead of wi with probability pPrg0{wj <V− b wi | wi}.H o w -




(b wi − wi)Pr g0{wj <V− b wi | wi} (16)
ensures that party i has incentives to report his outside option truthfully.
Having deﬁned T(wi) for all wi, it remains to check whether ex ante,
these subsidies remain smaller than the expected surplus generated by the
a g r e e m e n t .T od ot h a t ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to check that conditional on each wi,
the expected subsidy (1−p)T(wi) is smaller than half the expected surplus,
that is,
(1 − p)T(wi) ≤
1
2
pEg0(V − wi − wj | wi). (17)
It is easy to check that (16) and (17) are compatible for some distribution
g0. 25
5.5 What’s next?
The above analysis has shown that ineﬃciencies are inevitable (even if the
private informations held by the various parties are correlated) whenever
p a r t i e sc a ne x e r tt h e i rv e t or i g h ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m ea n dp a r t i e sc a nr e c e i v e
no subsidy ex post. The next step would be to analyze the form of the
second-best in such situations.
It should be mentioned that unlike in the independent distribution case
the mechanism design approach pursued in this paper does not allow for an
easy characterization of the second-best in general. (The elegant techniques
d e v e l o p e db yM y e r s o na n df o l l o w e r sd on o te x t e n dt ot h ec a s eo fc o r r e l a t e d
25For example, if g0(w1,w 2)=p0w1w2,o n eo b t a i n s
(1 − p)T(wi)=pp0w1 max(b wi − wi)























12, we get the desired inequality.
29distributions.) More work will be required to analyze the second-best in
general.
But, for some special forms of correlation the classical analysis for in-
dependent distributions can be used to characterize the second-best in our
setup with veto rights.
As an illustration, assume that there are two parties and outside options
are uniformly distributed on ΓV . Such a distribution induces some form of
(negative) correlation. However, because it can be viewed as the restriction
to the domain ΓV of the uniform density over [0,V]2 (for which the sec-
ond best is known), we can ﬁnd the second best when outside options are
uniformly distributed on ΓV .26
Indeed, from Myerson-Satterthwaite, we know that when outside op-
tions are uniformly distributed on [0,V]2 (distributions of outside options
are independent), the second-best (requiring only interim participation con-
straints) leads to having an agreement whenever w1 + w2 < 3V/4 (see their
characterization on pages 276-277). But, this is also the domain of agree-
ment induced by the Nash bargaining protocol when outside options are
uniformly distributed on ΓV . This implies that the allocation resulting from
the Nash bargaining protocol induces the second-best in our setup where
(w1,w 2) is uniformly distributed on ΓV .27
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6A p p e n d i x
To prove our result, we consider a direct truthful mechanism with veto rights
that is eﬃcient and that satisﬁes the ex post no subsidy constraint, and we







wj − ti(wi,w −i))dw−i.
Let ε = V − v. We will prove that there exists a constant a independent of
ε such that
Hi(wi) ≤ aε. (18)
Since ΓV ∩Γg contains Γv, and since ti(wi,w −i) ≥ wi, this inequality in turn




E(Ui − wi) ≥
Z
w∈ΓV ∩Γg


















g(wi,w −i)Sdw− εPr(S ∈ [0,ε]) − aεV
Adding these inequalities for all players, and since
X
i








g(wi,w −i)Sdw ≤ Nε(Pr(S ∈ [0,ε]) + aV )
which is impossible for ε small.
We now turn to the critical part of the proof, which consists in showing
that inequality (18) holds.
First observe that the ex post participation and the no subsidy con-




wj ≥ ti(wi,w −i) ≥ wi, (19)
32which implies that Hi(wi) ≥ 0. We now use incentive compatibility con-
straints to derive an upper bound on Hi(wi). Incentive compatibility re-
quires that for all b wi >w i,
Z
w∈ΓV ∩Γg
g(wi,w −i)ti(wi,w −i)dw−i ≥
Z
(b wi,w−i)∈Γv






























Let ∆ = b wi − wi. The last term is bounded by (ε + ∆)Pr{0 ≤ S ≤ ε + ∆},
hence it is below b(ε + ∆)2 for some constant b independent of ε and ∆.
To bound the ﬁrst term, observe that there exist m>0 and M such that
m ≤ g(wi,w −i) ≤ M and |
∂g
∂wi |≤ M, i =1 ,2,h e n c ew eh a v e :
g(wi,w j) ≤ g(b wi,w j)+ | g(wi,w −i) − g(b wi,w −i) |
≤ g(b wi,w j)(1 + M∆/m).
We thus obtain:




Let ρ =m a x ( M/m,b) and consider wi ≤ v−ε.W ec h o o s e∆ = v−wi
N ,w h e r e
N is set so that ε/2 ≤ ∆ ≤ ε. We obtain the sequence of inequalities:
Hi(wi) ≤ Hi(wi + ∆)(1 + ρ∆)+ρ(ε + ∆)2
≤ Hi(wi +2 ∆)(1 + ρ∆)2 + ρ(ε + ∆)2(1 + (1 + ρ∆))




... ≤ ρ(ε + ∆)2
N−1 X
k=0





33As N gets large, the term ∆N(1+ρ∆)N remains bounded (by Ve ρV ). Since
the inequalities hold for all N, Hi(wi) remains bounded above by ρ
(2ε)2
ε/2 =
8ρε, which concludes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 The expected gain of party 1 with type w1
when announcing b w1 is
G(w1, b w1)=
Z
V − b w1+a(w2)
2 >w2
max(w1,











We now check that it is optimal for party 1 to announce b w1 = a(w1).G i v e n
the form of a(·) it is readily veriﬁed that whenever the announcements are
compatible, i.e. a(w1)+a(w2) <V,w eh a v et h a ta(wi) >w i for i =1 ,2,
hence the Nash bargaining share of each party i is above wi.T h i sa l l o w su s




















[(1/2)b(V − b w1) − b0(V − b w1)(b w1 − w1)]
where b(w)=−3
8V + 3
2w i st h ei n v e r s eo ff u n c t i o na(·). Straightforward
computations show that
∂G(w1, b w1)
∂ b w1
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
b w1=a(w1)
=0 .
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